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Non-technical summary
Human capital is one of the main competitive assets of German firms. The impact of
different training forms and the time pattern of productivity effects have not been
discussed for Germany, however. In addition most studies for Germany suffer from
estimation bias by not taking into account endogeneity of the training decision and
unobserved heterogeneity. This paper derives the estimation equation from an
extended Cobb-Douglas production function including training variables. For the
estimation, the IAB establishment panel is used, a large and representative data set
for all profit oriented sectors of the German economy. Besides the productivity
impact of the share of employees trained in the establishment, the impact of seven
different training forms is considered. In addition estimation biases, because firms do
not randomly choose to offer training (selectivity bias), differ with respect to
characteristics not included in the data set (unobserved heterogeneity) and with
respect to characteristics included in the data set (omitted variable bias) are taken
into account. This paper treats all of these biases simultaneously in a panel
estimation and interpretes the biases found.
In the first estimation, the impact of training in the first half of 1997 on value added
in the entire year 1997 is calculated. In addition, the lagged impacts of training on
productivity 1998 and 1999 are explored. Selectivity bias is avoided by explicitly
estimating the decision of the firm to offer training in a first step. The selection
probit estimation includes the following identifying variables in addition to several
other control variables: three variables indicating that the establishment expects skill
gaps and two variables indicating that training and apprenticeship training are the
preferred reaction on skill shortages. These identifying variables are correlated with
the decision of the firm to offer training in 1997, but not with productivity in the
same year or later. In a second step the production function is corrected by adding
the normal hazard function for the decision to offer training. Unobserved
heterogeneity is controlled for by estimating the production function with only the
variable factors labour and capital in a fixed effects panel regression for the period
1997-1999. This allows us to calculate the persistent differences in productivity
between the establishments (fixed effects). In a second step, the fixed effects are
explained by the (quasi) fixed training variables and other control variables. In a last
regression, also selectivity is controlled for in the panel regression by adding the
selection correction term in the second step estimation. Omitted variable bias is
avoided in all regressions by adding a large set of additional control variables
covering firm and workforce heterogeneity and additional personnel management
variables that are closely related to training.
Increasing the share of employees participating at training in the first half of a year
has a positive and significant effect on firm productivity in the same and the next
year. The impact in the third year is positive but insignificant. While formal internal
and external training courses increase productivity in the same year and the years
after, their impact decreases over time. The positive productivity impact of quality
circles increases over time, instead, while training on the job has a persistent negative
productivity effect in the cross section estimations. When we control for selectivity,
the measured productivity effects of training further increase, suggesting that firms
with an inefficient production structure deliberately use training in order to boost
productivity. When we also take unobserved heterogeneity into account in a fixed
effects panel regression, the measured impact of training on productivitiy increases
further. This suggests that firms offering training have productivity reducing
unobserved characteristics. In the panel regressions, formal internal and external
courses have the highest positive productivity impact and self-induced learning and
quality circles have a lower but still significant impact on the fixed productivity
effects. Training on the job, seminars and talks and job rotation do not have an
impact on structural productivity differences, however. When training intensity
increases by 1%, structural productivity increases by 0.3%. It is finally shown that
omitting variables identifying establishment characteristics like co-determination, the
legal form, innovation and investment behaviour, personnel measures or the
qualification composition of the work force would lead to a strong overestimation of
the productivity effects of training.
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Abstract
This paper presents for the first time panel evidence on the productivity effects of training
intensity and different training forms in Germany. It hereby takes account of selectivity of
training activities, unobserved heterogeneity of establishments as well as omitted variable
bias. Using the waves 1997 – 2000 of the IAB establishment panel, it is found that when the
share of trained employees in 1997 is higher, productivity is significantly higher in the
period 1997 - 1999. Formal internal and external courses have the highest positive impact on
productivity, self-induced learning and quality circles have a smaller positive impact, while
training on the job, seminars and talks and job rotation do not affect productivity. The
decision to train is selective. Firms with an inefficient production structure deliberately use
training in order to boost productivity.
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21 Introduction
Human capital, knowledge, and skills are increasingly important competitive assets
within firms. Employee training sponsored by the firm is therefore perceived as one
of the most important measures to gain and keep productivity. Especially the German
economy that is based on a relatively high share of well qualified employees who
frequently work in flexible, complex and diversified quality production derives its
main competitive advantages from human capital (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994, pp.
39-43, Roth, 1997). In 1998, German firms accordingly invested on average the
substantial amount of 1,128 EUR per year per employee in continuous training,
Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (2002), p.99. The positive impact of training on
firm productivity in the German economy is not undisputed, however. Some
employee training may not contribute to increases in productivity because it is used
as a sorting device for employers in order to determine who is promoted or as a tool
to increase incentives, motivation or to reduce turnover (de Koning, 1994). Several
commentators argue that vocational and continuing training in Germany provides
employees with knowledge only temporarily needed, for example if infrequent
maintenance or re-organisation is necessary (Roth, 1997). This kind of training
primarily is directed at increasing flexibility in emergency situations instead of
continuous productivity increases. Therefore, German workers frequently have
redundant cognitions and part of their skills is not used in daily work (Berg, 1994).
Training may also just be a necessity when the workforce is not adequately qualified
and firms are forced to retrain workers internally instead of facing high labour
turnover costs and a shortage of skilled workers on the labour market (Zwick and
Schröder, 2001). It will be shown that the empirical evidence in Germany on the
productivity effects of training is not conclusive and has considerable gaps and
therefore this issue is not clear a-priori and still open for empirical evaluation.
This paper explores if the productivity effect of training decreases or increases over
time taking into account that the pay-off of the training investment may reveal itself
only at some point in the future (Bassi et al., 2001). It also takes a closer look at the
productivity effects of different forms of training which is demanded by many
commentators, see for example Bartel (1994) or Barrett and O’Connell (2001). The
data set used provides us with a wealth of different training dimensions that allow a
digression on what form of training enhances productivity in Germany.
A growing number of papers seeks to measure the effect of employer-provided
training on productivity using representative firm-level data from several sectors in
the economy (Bartel, 1994, Bartel, 1995, Black and Lynch, 1996, Ballot, Fakhfakh
and Taymaz, 2001, Barrett and O´Connell, 2001, Bellmann and Büchel, 2001).
Usually, a positive (and sometimes significant) effect of training on productivity is
found in these studies. The measurement of productivity effects of training may
suffer primarily from two biases, however (Kruse, 1993, Dearden, Reed and Van
Reenen, 2000, Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001). First, firms that offer training may
also be structurally more productive due to time invariant unobserved factors such as
management quality, the exposition to technical change, a more active personnel
department or better management - employee relations. This is called unobserved
heterogeneity. Second, transitory shocks like the introduction of a new technology or
a deterioration of market conditions could change productivity and induce changes in
3training efforts at the same time. We therefore analyze if German firms tend to train
in good economic circumstances or – as evidence suggests for the USA and UK
(Bartel, 1994 or Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen, 2000) – in periods when they have
to catch up with regard to productivity. Summing up, firms do not decide randomly if
they train their employees or not and training is not a strictly exogeneous variable in
the productivity equation. This source of estimation bias is called selectivity bias.
In contrast to most papers on productivity effects of training this paper addresses
both problems simultaneously exploring several different estimation techniques and
specifications and thus circumvents drawbacks which comparable papers suffer
from. In addition, it indicates the size and direction of the estimation biases incurred.
Finally, it presents for the first time representative panel data evidence on the
productivity effects of training in German firms.
Several papers estimate the productivity impact of training in very parsimonious
specifications (Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen, 2000, Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz,
2001, Barrett and O´Connell, 2001, Bellmann and Büchel, 2001). This paper
demonstrates that the inclusion of a broad variety of additional firm characteristics
and especially of different personnel measures improves the estimation and reduces
the measured productivity impact. Estimations excluding these variables therefore
may suffer from omitted variable bias and the training measure may pick up
productivity effects of other variables that are like some personnel measures
frequently closely correlated with training (Wolf and Zwick, 2002).
This paper is constructed as follows. First, a short survey presents the main results
and the drawbacks of the literature on the productivity effects of training on the firm
level. Then an empirical model correcting for unobserved time invariant
heterogeneity and selection bias is developed on the basis of a standard production
function. The fourth section presents the data basis and several regressions
measuring the impact of training on productivity. The regressions establish that
omitted variable, selection, and unobserved heterogeneity bias matter. In addition,
the time structure and the productivity effects of different dimensions of training are
explored. The last section concludes.
2 Literature
In this section, a short survey of the literature is given which places considerable
emphasis on the data and the estimation techniques used and their possible
shortcomings (see also the literature review in Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen,
2000). This allows a comparison of the results obtained in this study with those in the
literature because it will become clear that the estimation technique and the data
basis may play a decisive role for measuring the productivity impacts. Only studies
using firm-level data from several sectors are included.
Bartel (1994) first estimates a simple cross section production function including
formal training programmes in the effective labour term. She does not find an effect
of formal training on productivity in the same year. The estimation may be biased,
however, due to unobserved heterogeneity between firms that leads to a correlation
between the formal training measure and the error term, see Griliches and Mairesse
4(1995). In order to avoid this bias, she estimates a first difference model in which the
change in labour productivity between 1983 and 1986 is regressed on changes in the
incidence of training programmes. She finds that businesses that were operating
below their expected labour productivity levels in 1983 implemented new employee
training programmes after 1983 that brought productivity up to the level of
comparable businesses by 1986.
Barrett and O´Connell (2001) apply the same estimation strategy while regressing the
level of training instead of the change in training on the change in productivity. They
argue that training is adding to human capital, which might lead to an increase in
productivity later on. They use data of two waves of Irish firms surveyed in 1993 and
1995 with a response rate in the second wave as low as one third of the initial firms.
Their main result is that the level of general training has a significantly positive
effect on productivity growth while this is not the case for the level of specific
training. Neither paper addresses endogeneity of the introduction of training
programmes, however, and they are based on deliberately chosen samples (Dearden,
Reed and Van Reenen, 2000).
Black and Lynch (1996) estimate a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
including training intensity, three specific types of training activities and several
controls for other workplace practices. The estimations are based on a data set from
the 1994 US-American National Center on the Educational Quality of the Workforce
(EQW), an employers survey, which was especially designed for this purpose. They
find no impact of the number of employees trained while a high percentage of formal
training outside working hours has a positive impact on productivity in
manufacturing and computer training has a positive impact on productivity in non-
manufacturing. Their cross-section study is prone to unobserved heterogeneity bias,
however.
Therefore, Black and Lynch (2001) supplement their data on training and other
workplace practices used in their 1996 article with panel data from the Longitudinal
Research Database (LRD). They check for observed and unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity between the firms by estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function
without the workplace practices in several fixed effects panel models. From these
regressions, they calculate the average firm-specific, time-invariant residual. In a
second step, they regress this average residual on training and other workplace
practices. In this paper, training measured by the number of employees trained still
has no impact on productivity in any regression (correcting for heterogeneity or not)
while some other personnel measures do have one. Black and Lynch (2001), p. 443,
admit, however, that their estimation techniques are prone to endogeneity bias in the
second estimation step.
Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz (2001) study the impact of the level of human capital
and R&D expenditures on firm performance for French and Swedish data. They
present results for several estimators (simultaneous OLS, random effects, lagged
random effects, fixed effects and panel GMM as well as system GMM). They find
that the impact of training hours and expenditures per employee on firm productivity
depends strongly on the estimation technique. In their preferred specification, the
system GMM, that takes training as an exogeneous variable, training has a positive
and significant impact in France, while in Sweden the effect is insignificant. Their
specification is very parsimonious taking only intangible assets and their interactions
5into account, while further firm and personnel characteristics are absent. In addition,
their sample size with 90 firms in France and 270 firms in Sweden is small and
specific. The French data set only contains large firms that all engage in training,
while the Swedish data set also includes non-training firms.
Bassi et al. (2001) correlate training expenditures with indicators for firm
performance a year later. They find that training expenditures have no correlation
with total sales per employee and a negative impact on income and profits in the next
year. The impact on Tobin´s Q and share prices is positive, however. This impact is
supernormally high which leads the authors to conclude that firms are underinvesting
in training. As they use only a very limited set of additional control variables, the
authors mention that training may serve as a marker for other unmeasured firm-level
attributes that are correlated with a firm´s long-term profitability.
Bellmann and Büchel (2001) estimate the productivity effects of training and check
for the selectivity bias in the decision to offer training or not. On the basis of the
German IAB establishment panel, they use an estimation of a cross-section Cobb-
Douglas production function including the training intensity. They explain first the
probability of an enterprise to offer training using a probit estimation and add the
probability to provide training to the production function estimation (see also
Greene, 2000 and section 4 in this paper). They find that training intensity has a
positive and significant effect on productivity. After correcting for selectivity,
training intensity has a slightly higher but now insignificant effect on productivity. In
their regression, selectivity is found to be random, however, i.e. the correction term
is not significant in their productivity equation. Their cross section results are prone
to biases from unobserved heterogeneity. A final problem with their study is that
they do not take into account further possibly complementary workplace practices
and firm characteristics.
Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000) present a study on the productivity impact of
training on the industry level in Great Britain. They use a long panel data set between
1983 and 1996 that entails information on training in every year. They address
unobserved heterogeneity as well as endogeneity by using a variety of estimation
strategies including system GMM methods. In addition, they calculate the impact and
the sign of the biases on the estimation results. They find a positive and significant
effect of training on sector productivity (therefore including inter firm knowledge
spill-overs). The estimation results increase when endogeneity and unobserved
heterogeneity are taken into account. There are two major drawbacks, however. First
they combine data on different aggregation levels which may lead to aggregation
bias. Second they do not control for additional personnel management measures and
therefore might incur omitted variable bias as well. A smaller problem is that
information on training covers only 4 weeks per year, respectively and service firms
have been dropped due to “measurement problems” in most regressions. In addition,
the effect of training on firm productivity may be the more relevant question than the
effect on sector productivity, because also personnel managers who decide on
offering training to employees do not take knowledge spillovers into account, De
Koning (1994).
Summing up the literature survey, most studies on the firm level find a positive
(although frequently insignificant) impact of training on productivity. In addition,
some training forms like general training, off-the-job training, and computer training
6seem to have a higher impact on productivity while sector effects may be higher than
firm effects. Most studies are plagued by severe measurement problems, however,
and there is only scant, cross-section evidence for Germany.
3 Derivation of the Empirical Models
Analogous to the previous literature, we assume a standard Cobb-Douglas production
function. Output Yi of firm i is a function of capital Ki and “effective labour” ELi
weighted by the number of employees trained, (Bartel, 1995, Dearden, Reed and Van
Reenen, 2000):
(1)    with  i i i i Ui TiY A K EL EL L L= ∗ ∗ = +
β γ τ ,
where Ai is a Hicks neutral efficiency parameter, LUi is the number of untrained and
LTi the number of trained employees. The parameter τ  is larger than one if training
has a positive effect on labour productivity. Equation (1) can be re-written as:
(2)    (1 ( 1) )i i i i iY A K L T= ∗ ∗ + −
β γ γτ ,
where Li = LTi + LUi and Ti = LTi/Li is the proportion of trained workers in an
establishment, or training intensity. If we take logs and use the approximation
ln(1+x) = x when x is small (see Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen, 2000), we get:
(3) ln ln ln ln ( 1) .i i i i i iY A K L T= + + + − +β γ γ τ ε
Our hypothesis is that trained employees are more productive than untrained
employees, or ( 1)−γ τ  is larger than zero which means that increasing the training
intensity has a positive impact on firm productivity.
The available empirical literature distinguishes only very crudely between different
training forms. Especially the difference between general and specific training
(Barrett and O´Connell, 2001), different training subjects (Black and Lynch, 1996)
and training for managers and other employees (Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz, 2001)
has been analyzed. Different training forms that may be chosen by the personnel
department or the employee to reach certain qualification goals like internal versus
external courses, job rotation versus training on the job etc. have not been analyzed
thoroughly, however. This paper therefore analyzes the productivity impact of seven
partly highly popular and widespread training forms (see the incidence of the
different training forms in 1997 in table A1). In order to estimate the impact of the
incidence of different training forms, we extend the Cobb-Douglas production
function accordingly by adding dummy variables Di,j indicating if a firm offered
formal external and internal training, self-induced learning, quality circles, training
on the job, seminars and talks or job rotation. Including these seven training forms
leads us to the following estimation equation:
,(3 ) ln ln ln ln with 1,...,7.i i i i j i j i iA Y A K L D V j= + + + + + =β γ τ δ ε
73.1 Cross Section Evidence
Empirically, many further factors in addition to capital, labour and training intensity
are relevant for firm productivity. In order to avoid omitted variable bias, a large
vector of further explanatory variables is considered (Dearden, Reed, and Van
Reenen, 2000, Black and Lynch, 2001). In particular, other dimensions of worker
heterogeneity like the share of qualified employees and firm heterogeneity like the
state of technical equipment and a dummy for firms investing in IT, co-determined or
exporting firms are included.
Training measures are closely correlated with other innovative personnel measures
increasing the participation of employees and usually summarised as “high
performance workplaces” (Whitfield, 2000, Barrett and O’Connell, 2001, and Wolf
and Zwick, 2002). Indeed, higher involvement of employees might increase the
inclination of employees to train. On the other hand, new workplace practices might
also increase the necessity of training especially when they go hand in hand with
increased flexibility and a higher grade of discretion for non-managerial employees.
Whitfield (2000) demonstrates that the average number of training days per
employee is positively correlated with the introduction of innovative personnel
measures. Wolf and Zwick (2002) also find a high joint incidence of training and
new workplace organisations. In order to avoid that the training dummy picks up
productivity effects from other personnel measures, we add a couple of crucial
additional controls for relevant innovative personnel measures: more responsibilities
for non-managers, team work, groups with their own cost responsibility, strong
selection procedures when hiring new employees, employee share ownership, and
profit sharing.
In order to estimate equation (3), we add a vector Vi entailing the variables described
above. As many empirical assessments of the productivity effect of training use
parsimonious specifications similar to (3), see Ballot, Fakhfakh, and Taymaz (2001),
Bellmann and Büchel (2001) and Barrett and O’Connell (2001), we also report
estimation results excluding further control variables and thereby show the size of
the omitted variable bias.
As training cannot be expected to have an instanteneous effect on productivity
(Bartel, 1995, Bassi et al., 2001), we use different lags between Tt-z,i, Dt.z,i,j and Yt,i
with t a year indicator and z an indicator for the lags used in our final cross section
specification, see equations (3´) and (3´´). This also allows us to see if there are time
effects in the productivity impact of training. As training intensity as well as the
incidence of different training forms are correlated over the years, the effects found
in later years can not be interpreted as pure lagged effects, however.
, , , , , , ,(3´ ) ln ln ln ln ( 1) ,t i t i t i t i t z i t i t iY A K L T V−= + + + − + +β γ γ τ δ ε
, , , , , , , ,(3 )´ ln ln ln ln with 1,...,7.t i t i t i t i j t z i j t i t iA Y A K L D V j−= + + + + + =β γ τ δ ε
3.2 Instrumental Variables Approach
The empirical results of the estimated productivity functions (3´) and (3A´) may be
biased because firms do not randomly decide to train. Investment in training is an
8endogenous decision of the firm, instead, which depends on the productivity effects
and the investment costs of training and other factors (Dearden, Reed, and Van
Reenen, 2000, Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001, Bellmann and Büchel, 2001).
Therefore the impact of training on productivity can be interpreted as a treatment
effect with endogeneous choice of the treatment (Maddala, 1983, Greene, 2000). Our
first measure against endogeneity is to take only lagged training intensity as
explanatory variable for value added. This should capture most of the endogeneity
problem (Bassi et al., 2001, Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001).
It can be shown, however, that the decision how many employees to train or to offer
training or not still is not truely exogeneous. Therefore, the training intensity variable
in equation (3´) and the decision to train or not in equation (3A´) have to be
instrumented in order to make them exogeneous by explaining these decisions
explicitly by variables correlated with training but not with productivity. Empirically,
the decision on the training intensity can be modelled as a reduced form in a tobit
model.1 The latent variable Tt,i* is therefore the optimal share of employees trained in
period t and can be defined as:
(4) Tt,i* = δ‘Zt,i + ut,i,
where Zt,i is a vector of relevant variables for the training intensity decision of the
firm. For the observable training intensity Tt,i, we obtain: Tt,i=1 when Tt,i*>1, Tt,i=0
if Tt,i* < 0, and Tt,i= Tt,i* if 0≤ Tt,i*≤1.
The decision to offer training or not in period t can be specified as a reduced form in
a probit model where the dependent variable It,i has the value one when the firm
offers training and zero otherwise. The latent variable It,i* is therefore the difference
between benefits and costs of offering training and can be defined as:
(4A) It,i* = δ‘Zt,i + ut,i,
where Zi is again the vector of relevant variables for the decision of the firm to
engage in training or not. A firm introduces training (Ii=1) when Ii* > 0 (or δ´Zi > -
ui) and it does not invest in training (Ii=0) if Ii* ≤ 0.
According to Maddala (1983) or Greene (2000), p. 933, we can consistently estimate
the production functions (3) and (3A) by using the estimated training intensity iT
from the tobit estimation (4) instead of Ti in (3´) and by adding a selection correction
term for training firms and non-training firms in equation (3A´) as follows:
,, , ,(3´ )´ ln ( 1) ,t z it i t i t iY X T −= + − +β γ τ ε
                                                
1 Alternative and closely related estimation procedures are logit and normit, see Greene
(2000). The main difference to the tobit model is that these techniques assume a nonlinear
S-bended relationship between the endogeneous and the exogeneous variables. A problem
arises with logit or normit estimation, if – as in this case – the training intensity equals
zero or one. These firms would either have to be dropped or their shares would have to be
changed ad hoc.
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where Xt,i is the complete vector of explanatory variables without the training
variables, i.e. Vi plus capital, labour and the constant and ( ' )Zφ γ  is the density
function and ( ' )ZγΦ  the distribution function of the estimated parameters in
equation (4). The parameter σ  therefore measures the covariance between the error
terms in the production function (3A´) and the selection equation (4A),
 cov( , )i iu=σ ε .
3.3 Fixed Effects Estimation
The second source of possible estimation bias considered here is unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity. This can be corrected by estimating equations (3´´) and
(3A´´) by a fixed effects panel regression. Between two years, training intensity and
most other explanatory variables in Vi do not change much, however, and therefore
the ratio between signal and noise is low if the training intensity, the incidence of
different training forms, and other quasi fixed variables would be included into the
fixed effects equation (Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen, 2000). We therefore adopt
the two step procedure proposed by Black and Lynch (2001). In the first step,
productivity is estimated by the variable production factors capital and labour and
additional time dummies:
, , , , ,(5) ln ln ln ln .i t i t i t i t t i i tY A K L P= + + + + +β γ δ ν ε
with νi the unobserved time independent fixed effect and εi,t the idiosyncratic
component of the error term and Pt the time dummies. The fixed effect is the average
establishment specific difference from productivity expected on the basis of the
inputs. This time invariant variable therefore measures if establishment productivity
structurally was below or above that of the other firms and serves as dependent
variable for the second estimation step. In the second step, the quasi fixed variables
like training intensity, firm characteristics or personnel measures explain these fixed
effects:
, , ,(6) ( 1) ,i t i t i t iV T= + − +ν β γ τ ζ
, , , ,(6 ) with 1, ... ,7.i t i t i j t iA V D j= + + =ν β τ ζ
We correct for the unobserved heterogeneity and the selectivity bias simultaneously
by including the estimated training intensity iT  such as in (3´´) and adding the
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selectivity correction term (the normal hazard function) for the decision of the firm to
offer training from (3A´´) in equation (6) or (6A).2
4 The Data
The empirical analysis of the impact of training on firm productivity is performed on
the basis of the IAB establishment panel (for detailed information see Bellmann et
al., 2000 and Bellmann and Büchel, 2001). Firms in this panel are drawn from all
establishments in Germany with at least one employee who has a social security
number. Therefore, only establishments consisting of employees not covered by
social insurance (mainly farmers, mine workers, artists, and journalists) along with
public enterprises with only federal employees are excluded. There is a large set of
questions that is asked every year on production, investment, industry sector,
employee structure, personnel problems, business strategy and vocational training.
The survey is held in the middle of the year. Some questions like average
employment during one year, output and profit situation are therefore asked
retrospectively in the following wave. Every year, additional questions are added on
an irregular basis. In the waves 1997 and 1999, additional detailed information on the
training behaviour of the firms was collected. Panel information from the waves
1997 until 2000 is used here.
Capital is not directly measured in the data set and therefore it is approximated by
total investments minus expansion investments. The logic behind this is that firms on
average write off a fixed share of their capital and replace this yearly. Implicitly it is
therefore assumed that replacement investments equal capital depreciation.
Investments are deflated by the input price index of the German Federal Statistical
Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2001). A construction of the capital stock by the
perpetual inventory method (Hall and Mairesse, 1995) that depends on the
assumption of a constant investment growth rate and a constant linear depreciation
rate for capital lead to similar results. Value added (i.e. revenues minus input costs)
is depreciated by the product price index for different sectors. We include only profit
oriented establishments and those that have not been merged with other
establishments or have merged other establishments. In 1997, we have 5675
establishments in our gross sample, in 1998 we have 6192 and in 1999 6886.
Descriptive statistics of the data used can be found in Tables A1 – A3 in the
appendix.
                                                
2 This provides us with:
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4.1 The training decision of the firm
About one third of the firms in Germany do not invest in continuous employee
training at all and cope with qualification demands by other measures. In 1997, about
64% of the commercial firms offered training for their employees while on average
19% of the workforce in these firms participated in courses (compare Table A1). In
1999, the number of training firms (calculated also from the IAB establishment
panel) increased to 66% while training intensity was 21%. The expenditures for
different training forms are differing widely, see Table 1. While the enterprises spend
by far the most per employee on internal and external formal courses, expenditures
for self-induced learning and participation at seminars and talks are considerably
smaller. Also the incidence of different training forms varies. Besides formal
training, most training firms also offer training on the job and participation at
seminars or talks. Job rotation, quality circles and self-induced training are much less
wide spread.
Table 1: Training costs per employee and incidence, different training forms
Training form Expenditures* Incidence**
Formal internal training 562 37%
Formal external training 215 55%
Seminars and talks 39 42%
 Training on the job 111 40%
Job Rotation not available 9%
Quality circles not available 13%
Self-induced learning 35 14%
Source: *Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (2002), figures in Euro for 1998, ** IAB
Establishment Panel, Wave 1997, own calculations.
This paper concentrates on the influence of training in 1997 on productivity in the
years 1998 and 1999. In our cross section regressions, we therefore have t = 1998,
1999 and z = 1,2. This allows us to identify lagged productivity effects of training.
We will show that although we use lagged training variables, nevertheless
endogeneity of training plays a role for our results. In this section, the selection
equation to offer training in 1997 and the decision on training intensity in 1997 are
estimated. Thus, the decision of firms to pay for training of their employees is
modeled in a binary probit model and the decision of the firm how many of their
employees should obtain training is modeled in a tobit model. In order to effectively
control for selectivity in the productivity estimation presented in the next section, we
have to find identifying variables that have a significant influence on the decision to
train or on training intensity but not on productivity (Dearden, Reed, and Van
Reenen, 2000). This paper uses a unique set of questions that identifies expected skill
gaps and the reaction of the personnel department on skill shortages as suitable
identifying variables for both decisions. When firms expect skill gaps in the future
because some employees will be on maternal leave or made redundant in the near
future or because the demand for skills increases in general, this may induce them to
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introduce training now. It can be shown that productivity is not affected by these
expectations which means that there is no strong correlation between the expected
skill gaps over time or between the expected and the actual skill gaps. Moreover, the
preferred reaction of the establishment (i.e. mainly the personnel department) on skill
shortages has the same statistical properties. When the establishment mainly reacts
by additional apprenticeship training or training of the employees on skill gaps
(instead of a high priority on hiring skilled employees from the labour market), this
increases the probability that the establishment offers training but it does not have an
impact on contemporary productivity.
In addition, usual explanatory variables for the inclination of the establishment to
train or for the determination of the chosen training intensity such as the number of
employees, the share of qualified employees, a dummy for investors in information
and communication technology (IT technology), state of the art technical
installations, a dummy for establishments with collective wage agreements, co-
determination and apprenticeship training, sector dummies, and the location of the
establishment in East or West Germany are added (Jirjahn, 1998, Düll and Bellmann,
1998, Gerlach and Jirjahn, 2001, Bellmann and Büchel, 2001). The descriptive
statistics of these variables can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. The
determinants of the training decision according to equation (4A) are summarized in
Table 2 while the determinants of training intensity according to equation (4) are
summarized in Table 3. For both decisions the same set of explanatory variables is
used.
Table 2: Probit estimation to explain if a firm trains or not, 1997
Exogenous Variables Coefficients z-Value
Redundancies expected 0.243*** 3.82
Many employees are expected to be on maternal leave 0.295*** 2.87
High qualification need expected 0.545*** 6.77
Apprenticeship training high priority reaction on skill
shortages
0.230*** 4.46
Training high priority reaction on skill shortages 0.646*** 12.91
Number of employees 0.322*** 19.57
Share of qualified employees 0.558*** 7.75
State of the art technical equipment 0.188*** 4.37
Investor in IT 0.229*** 5.00
Collective wage agreement 0.189*** 4.23
Apprenticeship training 0.368*** 7.95
15 sector dummies and East Germany dummy Yes
Pseudo R2 0.33
Number of observations 5640
Comment: The significance level is marked by stars: *** significant at 1 percent.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1997 and 1998, own calculations.
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From this regression, we calculate the probability that a firm offers continuous
training and add it as a correction term in the production function, see equation
(3A´). It would have been desirable to have a separate correction term for all training
forms. This does not seem achievable, however, because the categories are not
mutually exclusive and therefore a multivariate probit is not possible. When we
estimate the probability to offer each category separately, we incur a bias because the
training forms are strongly correlated with each other. Therefore a single correction
term characterizing the decision to offer training or not seems the best we can
achieve.
Table 3: Tobit estimation to explain training intensity, 1997
Exogenous Variables Coefficients z-Value
Redundancies expected 0.057*** 3.06
Many employees are expected to be on maternal leave 0.059** 2.01
High qualification need expected 0.151*** 7.17
Apprenticeship training high priority reaction on skill
shortages
0.094*** 5.13
Training high priority reaction on skill shortages 0.227*** 12.92
Firm size 20-199 0.070*** 4.17
Firm size 200-499 0.101*** 3.69
Firm size 500-1000 0.084** 2.20
Firm size 1001+ 0.062* 1.67
Co-determination 0.120** 2.24
Share of qualified employees 0.236*** 9.47
State of the art technical equipment 0.084*** 5.64
Investor in IT 0.067*** 4.58
Collective wage agreement 0.091*** 5.78
Apprenticeship training 0.108*** 6.81
15 sector dummies and East Germany dummy Yes
Pseudo R2 0.18
Number of observations 5561
2598 left-censored observations (training intensity = 0)
2730 uncensored observations
233 right-censored observations (training intensity = 1)
Comment: The significance levels are marked by stars: *** significant at 1 percent,
** at 5 percent and * at 10 percent.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1997 and 1998, own calculations.
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From this equation, we calculate the predicted training intensity values and replace
the training intensities from the data, see equation (3´).
Most German firms react on skill shortages by additional training efforts because the
external skilled labour market is thin (Roth, 1997, Zwick and Schröder, 2001).
Therefore, it is not surprising that firms that expect that workers will leave, be on
maternal leave or that expect that they will encounter difficulties in finding new
skilled workers step up training. It can also be anticipated that firms that give a
higher priority to additional apprenticeship training and continuous training efforts
instead of hiring skilled employees from the labour market when they have vacancies
for skilled jobs are more prone to offer training. It is also well known that additional
apprenticeship training, IT investments and state of the art technical equipment
induce training needs (Düll and Bellmann, 1998, Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen,
2000, Gerlach and Jirjahn, 2001). Large firms usually train more because they
frequently have an own training department and the incidence of employees with
training needs is larger. Collective wage agreements frequently also entail fringe
benefits like training and a co-determined management gives continuous training a
higher priority. The higher the qualification level of the employees the higher is their
training need and therefore firms with a larger share of qualified employees tend to
train more. Finally, firms offering apprenticeship training in order to provide the
needed skills, frequently also offer training for their employees. All these
correlations have been empirically shown for German firms for example by Düll and
Bellmann (1998), Bellmann and Büchel (2001), and Gerlach and Jirjahn (2001). We
also find these correlations while the East Germany dummy and the sector dummies
are jointly significant, see Table 1. We do not report in Table 1 that in comparison to
the banking sector – which is the reference sector – agriculture, the consumption
goods industry, retail and wholesale trade and interestingly also the educational
establishments offer significantly less training while insurance and business services
offer more training.
4.2 Estimation of the Productivity Effects of Training
In order to estimate the productivity effects of increasing continuous training
intensity and different continuous training forms, first equations (3) and (3A) without
selection correction are estimated. The estimation results for the lagged impact of
training intensity in the first half of 1997 on value added in 1998 and 1999 are shown
in the Tables 4 and 5. In addition to capital and labour, we add 15 sector dummies
and a dummy for East German firms in order to capture the differences in
productivity between the sectors and the productivity gap of East German firms. We
also take account of productivity differences between different legal forms. Qualified
employees, investments in IT and a state of the art technical equipment usually
increase firm productivity (Black and Lynch, 2001) while firms facing international
competition and firms with co-determination are also more productive (Jirjahn,
1998). We finally add employee participation, teamwork, units with own costs and
results accounting, stringent hiring rules and incentive payments as dummies for
several dimensions of personnel management that may be correlated with training
and relevant for productivity (Wolf and Zwick, 2002). The descriptive statistics of
the variables used can be found in Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix.
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Estimation of equation (3) shows that training intensity in the first half of 1997 has a
positive impact on productivity, see column 2 and 6 in Table 4. The impact on firm
productivity in 1998 is around 0.15. It is smaller and not significant after two years
(in 1999) any more, however. In addition, we find that the firms produce with
constant scale elasticities and a capital intensity between 0.15 and 0.18 depending on
the estimation specification.3 The additional explanatory variables have the expected
sign. The share of qualified employees and the dummies for exporting firms, firms
investing in IT and those having state of the art equipment and being co-determined
all have a positive (but frequently insignificant) impact on productivity while
individual firms are significantly less productive than firms with limited liability.
Employee participation, stringent hiring rules and incentive payments have a
tendency to improve productivity while the dummies for firms with teamwork and
units with own costs and results accounting have a negative sign. The additional
personnel measures have individually frequently an insignificant, but jointly a highly
significant impact on productivity (see also Wolf and Zwick, 2002). The East
Germany dummy and the sector dummies are also jointly highly significant.
In contrast for example to Bartel (1994), the size of the estimated productivity impact
is clearly reduced when we add further variables in matrix Vi while the explanatory
power of the regression increases. In a production function regression entailing
besides capital, labour and training intensity only the East Germany dummy and the
15 sector dummies, the parameter of training intensity is highly significant and
equals 0.23 for 1998 and 0.18 for 1999. Therefore a parsimonious estimation that
only takes labour, capital, training and very few additional training parameters into
account tends to overestimate the productivity impact of continuous training in
Germany.
When we differentiate between several training forms, see equation (3A´), we find
that formal external courses have a positive significant impact on productivity, see
Table 5 for the lagged productivity effects in 1998 and 1999. While the productivity
impact of external training in the first half of 1997 increases from 1998 to 1999, the
impact of formal internal courses has a positive impact on productivity in 1998 only,
while there is no effect in 1999. Training on the job has a persistent negative effect
on productivity. Training circles only create a positive productivity impact with a lag
of more than one year.
In order to correct for selectivity bias in these regressions, the selection correction
term on basis of the selection estimates in Table 2 are added in the estimation of
equation (3A’´) in Table 5. The selection correction term is negative for (3A´´) and
the corrected impact of all continuous training forms on productivity increases
accordingly (except for quality circles). The same is observed when the predicted
training intensities are used instead of the observed training intensities. The
productivity impact increases considerably for both years. We learn from this
exercise that firms have a higher inclination to train in times of a productivity
disadvantage. Not taking selectivity into account underestimates the productivity
                                                
3 The capital intensity is low in comparison to other production function estimations. This is
probably caused by the use of a proxy for capital because we lack direct information on
capital.
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effects of training, accordingly. While the estimated productivity impact of training
increases after selection correction, the impact of the other explanatory variables on
productivity is virtually unchanged. This pattern of an increased productivity
estimate after selectivity control was also found in Bartel (1994) and Dearden, Reed
and Van Reenen (2000) for the UK and USA. Bellmann and Büchel (2001) find on
the other hand that after controlling for selectivity, the measured contemporaneous
productivity impact of training intensity decreases and loses significance. The
selection correction term in their regression is negative and insignificant, however.4
Our result can be interpreted in different ways. Probably firms train in slack periods,
i.e. when it is cheap to engage employees with other tasks than production or they
train in order to catch up with the productivity level of their competitors.
In order to correct for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate a fixed
effects panel regression for the period 1997-1999. This involves a two-step
procedure regressing first value added on capital, labour and time dummies in a fixed
effects estimation on the basis of equation (5). Then the fixed effects are determined
by calculating the average error terms per firm during the estimation period (see
Black and Lynch, 2001). In the second step, these fixed effects are regressed on the
quasi fixed factors training intensity, the different training forms and the other
explanatory variables in 1997. The first estimation step suffers from the well-known
low capital and labour estimates in regressions on value added (Griliches and
Mairesse, 1995), but the results are comparable to those in Black and Lynch (2001),
see Table A4 in the appendix. The second step regresses the establishment fixed
effects calculated from the first step on the quasi fixed factors training and the other
variables in Xi. Training intensity has a significant positive impact on the fixed
effects, see Table 6. Formal external and internal courses, self-induced learning and
quality circles have a positive significant impact on productivity, while training on
the job, seminars and talks as well as job rotation have no impact.
When selectivity is simultaneously taken into account by using the predicted training
intensity variables, see equation (6´) or including the selection correction term from
(6A´), the estimated productivity impact of training intensity increases again. Also
the measured productivity impact of formal courses increases (most notably that of
formal external courses) while the impact of self-induced learning and quality circles
is almost unchanged (see Table 6). Training in the firms frequently is assigned to
those employees who are best able to benefit from it. Therefore the estimated
productivity effect is a so-called “treatment on the treated” than an average
productivity effect and it is save to assume that the productivity effect of training
would decrease when training intensity would be increased more than marginally
(Dearden, Reed, Van Reenen, 2000). The dummy variables for the different training
forms on the other hand describe the potential effect of an increase of say formal
external training from no employees to all employees which is the maximal and
empirically rather improbable effect of introducing a certain training measure for all
employees. Omitted variable bias would again change these results. When we re-
calculate the second estimation step in Table 6 taking account of selectivity and
including besides the training variables only the East Germany dummy and the sector
                                                
4 This may be a consequence of a different definition of the selection correction term that is
neither defined explicitly nor interpreted in their paper.
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controls, we would obtain an impact of training intensity of 4.26 and positive impacts
of all training forms between 0.01 (job rotation) and 1.07 (formal external courses).
5 Conclusions
This paper shows that training intensity has a positive and significant effect on firm
productivity in Germany even after two years. While formal internal and external
training has a positive impact on firm productivity in the same year and the following
year, the impact of internal training decreases in the third year. Although it is
widespread and firms spend a lot of money for it, training on the job has a persistent
negative effect on firm productivity. Quality circles only have a productivity impact
with a time lag of more than one year.
Endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity both have an impact on the measurement
of the productivity impact. Checking for endogeneity by adding a selection
correction term and using instrumental variable techniques increases the measured
productivity impact of training intensity and different training forms. This means that
firms facing a productivity gap select training as a measure to close it. We can
conclude that one motivation of firms to train is in order to regain competitiveness
because it is a suitable means to reduce productivity gaps with respect to
competitors. Therefore unobserved heterogeneity should be controlled for in addition
to selectivity in order not to obtain biased productivity estimates.
The paper also shows that frequently used measures like training on the job and
participation at seminars or talks do not have an impact on the fixed productivity
effects of the establishment. The highest productivity impact can be obtained by
offering more structural approaches like formal internal and external training
courses. Also cheap measures such as self-induced learning (which is frequently
based on e-learning) and quality circles that are used by around 10% of the German
firms only have a positive impact on structural firm productivity. It therefore seems
that these measures are still under-utilized in Germany.
Finally, significant omitted variable bias is detected. When a broad variety of firm,
employee and personnel management characteristics is not taken into account, the
estimated productivity impact is much too high.
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6 Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 1997
Variables Average Answers Comments
Training 1997 0.64 5675 Share of firms offering training in first half of 1997
Training intensity 1997 0.19 5428 Number of trained employees in first half of
1997/number of employees
Formal external courses 0.55 5428 External courses, seminars offered in first half of
1997, Yes/No
Formal internal courses 0.37 5428 Internal courses, seminars offered in first half of
1997, Yes/No
Training on the job 0.40 5428 Training on the job (instruction, learning by doing)
offered in first half of 1997, Yes/No
Participation at seminars
and talks
0.42 5428 Participation at presentations, seminars, fairs
offered in first half of 1997, Yes/No
Job rotation 0.09 5428 Job rotation offered in 1997, Yes/No
Self-induced learning 0.14 5428 Self induced learning on the basis of computer
aided programmes, literatures offered in first half of
1997, Yes/No
Quality circles 0.13 5428 Quality circles, discussion groups, participation
groups etc. offered in first half of 1997, Yes/No
Redundancies expected 0.14 5640 Over the next 2 years, redundancies are expected,
Yes/No
Many employees are
expected to be on
maternal leave
0.05 5460 Over the next 2 years, organisational problems due
to maternity leave are expected, Yes/No
High qualification need
expected
0.11 5640 Over the next 2 years, a large demand for training
and qualifications is expected
Apprenticeship training
reaction to skill
shortages
0.35 5640 Apprenticeship training highest priority to fill skills
gap (in contrast to training and hiring skilled
workers)
Training reaction to skill
shortages
0.35 5640 Training own employees has highest priority to fill
skills gap (in contrast to apprenticeship training and
hiring skilled employees)
Investment in IT 0.65 5675 Investment in communication or electronic data
procession, Yes/No
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Table A1 (continued)
Share of qualified
employees 1997
0.60 5666 Share of employees with a formal qualification
degree on all employees
Exporter 0.22 5450 Exporter, from wave 1998, Yes/No
Co-determination 0.34 5640 Firm has a work council Yes/No
State of the art technical
equipment
0.72 5450 Technical equipment is marked state of the art in
comparison to sector
Firm size 1-19
(reference)
0.40 5640 Establishment has 1-19 employees in 1997
Firm size 20-199 0.40 5640 Establishment has 20-199 employees in 1997
Firm size 200-499 0.10 5640 Establishment has 200-499 employees in 1997
Firm size 500-999 0.04 5640 Establishment has 500-999 employees in 1997
Firm size 1,000+ 0.06 5640 Establishment has more than 1,000 employees in
1997
Collective wage 0.68 5640 Firm is subject to collective wage agreements,
Yes/No
Apprenticeship 0.61 5640 Firm offers apprenticeship training, Yes/No
Individual firm 0.27 5640 Individual firm, Yes/No
Partnership 0.10 5640 Partnership, Yes/No
Limited company
(reference category)
0.49 5640 Limited Company, Yes/No
Publicly listed
company
0.07 5640 Publicly listed company, Yes/No
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1997-2000, representative values
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 1998
Variables Average Answers Comments
Value Added 14.07 4154 Turnover minus input costs and costs for third
parties, deflated, ln
Capital 11.85 6221 Proxy: Investments minus expansion investments,
logs, ln, deflated, from wave 1999
Labour 3.21 6192 Number of employees, ln
Investment in IT 0.66 6176 Investment in communication or electronic data
procession, Yes/No
Share of qualified
employees
0.62 6187 Share of employees with a formal qualification
degree on all employees
Exports 0.22 6180 Exporter, from wave 1999, Yes/No
State of the art technical
equimpment equipment
0.75 6179 Technical equipment is marked state of the art in
comparison to sector, Yes/No
Employee Participation 0.23 6079 Firm shifted responsibility and decisions to lower
ranks until 1998, Yes/No
Teamwork 0.16 6079 Firm has team work and independent groups in
1998, Yes/No
Units with own costs
and results accounting
0.12 6079 Firm has units with own costs and results
accounting in 1998, Yes/No
Stringent hiring rules 0.27 6079 Firm has formal hiring rules in 1998, Yes/No
Incentive payments 0.13 6079 Firm has gain sharing or employee share ownership
in 1998, Yes/No
Co-determination 0.34 6170 Firm has a work council, Yes/No
Exporter 0.22 6221 Firm exports, Yes, No
Individual firm 0.27 6221 Individual firm, Yes/No
Partnership 0.10 6221 Partnership, Yes/No
Limited company
(reference category)
0.51 6221 Limited Company, Yes/No
Publicly listed
company
0.06 6221 Publicly listed company, Yes/No
State of the art technical
equipment
0.75 6199 Technical equipment is marked state of the art in
comparison to sector, Yes/No
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1998 and 1999, own calculations
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Table A3: Descriptive Statistics 1999
Variables Average Answers Comments
Value Added 14.14 5969 Turnover minus input costs and costs for third
parties, in DM, ln, deflated, from wave 2000
Capital 13.11 8854 Proxy: Investments minus expansion investments,
logs, in DM, ln, deflated, from wave 2000
Labour 3.17 6670 Number of employees at 1.6.1999, ln
Investment in IT 0.87 6886 Investment in communication or electronic data
procession, Yes/No
Share of qualified
employees
0.69 6886 Share of employees with a formal qualification
degree on all employees
Exporter 0.26 6886 Exporter, Yes/No
Co-determination 0.36 6701 Firm has a work council, Yes/No
State of the art technical
equipment
0.75 5450 Technical equipment is marked state of the art in
comparison to sector, Yes/No
Profit sharing 0.14 6701 Firm has profit sharing rules for employees, Yes/No
Collective wage 0.68 6701 Firm is subject to collective wage agreements,
Yes/No
Individual firm 0.27 6701 Individual firm, Yes/No
Partnership 0.10 6701 Partnership, Yes/No
Limited company
(reference category)
0.51 6701 Limited Company, Yes/No
Publicly listed
company
0.06 6701 Publicly listed company, Yes/No
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1999 and 2000, own calculations
Table A4: Fixed effects productivitiy estimation, value added 1997 – 1999 (equation
(5)).
Coefficients z-values
Capital 0.028*** 2.88
Labour 0.321*** 5.17
Year Dummy 1998 - 0.015 - 0.83
Year Dummy 1999 0.023 1.25
Constant 13.16*** 54.45
Number of observations 5652
Adjusted R2 0.85
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Table 4: Lagged productivity effects of training intensity, OLS regressions
Equation (3´), for1998 Equation (3´´), for 1998 Equation (3´), for 1999 Equation (3´’), for 1999
Exogeneous Variables Coefficients z-Values Coefficients z-Values Coefficients z-Values Coefficients z-Values
Capital 0.160*** 10.35 0.157*** 10.18 0.181*** 10.73 0.177*** 10.59
Labour 0.795*** 33.90 0.780*** 32.54 0.745*** 27.72 0.731*** 26.86
Training intensity 1997 0.161** 2.08 0.318** 2.39 0.071 0.79 0.438*** 3.04
Share of qualified employees 0.340*** 4.30 0.285*** 3.48 0.380*** 3.97 0.315*** 3.21
Exporter 0.234*** 3.90 0.234*** 3.94 0.206*** 2.91 0.188*** 2.69
State of the art technical equipment 0.107** 2.33 0.111** 2.41 0.205*** 3.91 0.191*** 3.67
Investment in IT 0.045 0.99 0.035 0.75 0.122** 2.04 0.097 1.62
Co-determination 0.180*** 2.90 0.182*** 2.94 0.276*** 3.87 0.262*** 3.70
Individual firm - 0.337*** - 5.76 - 0.328*** - 5.60 - 0.351* - 5.23 - 0.341*** - 5.14
Partnership - 0.002 - 0.03 0.006 0.08 - 0.061 - 0.76 - 0.053 - 0.66
Publicly listed company 0.067 0.64 0.072 0.70 - 0.066 - 0.56 - 0.061 - 0.53
Employee Participation 0.088* 1.65 0.079 1.49 0.072 1.16 0.062 1.00
Teamwork - 0.020 - 0.33 - 0.015 - 0.26 - 0.009 - 0.13 - 0.016 - 0.24
Units with own costs and results
accounting
0.064 0.97 0.058 0.89 0.012 0.17 0.002 0.03
Stringent hiring rules 0.035 0.65 0.037 0.68 0.055 0.87 0.051 0.83
Incentive payments 0.101 1.52 0.102 1.55 0.111 1.44 0.113 1.47
Constant 9.702*** 52.83 9.835*** 52.23 9.626*** 51.99 9.794*** 51.31
15 Sector dummies and East
Germany dummy
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1440 1454 1209 1219
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.87
Comment: The significance levels are marked by stars: *** significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent and * at 10 percent.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1997 - 2000, own calculations.
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Table 5: Lagged productivity effects of alternative forms of training, OLS regressions
Equation (3A´), for 1998 Equation (3A´´), for 1998 Equation (3A´), for 1999 Equation (3A´´), for 1999
Exogeneous Variables Coefficients z-Values Coefficients z-Values Coefficients z-Values Coefficients z-Values
Capital 0.159*** 10.35 0.155*** 10.21 0.157*** 12.74 0.175*** 10.56
Labour 0.778*** 32.19 0.761*** 29.82 0.785*** 39.58 0.709*** 24.88
Formal external courses 1997 0.113** 2.13 0.203*** 3.08 0.174*** 3.17 0.351*** 4.56
Formal internal courses 1997 0.174*** 3.09 0.194*** 3.42 - 0.046 - 0.73 - 0.011 - 0.17
Training on the job 1997 - 0.130** - 2.34 - 0.106* - 1.87 - 0.118* - 1.88 - 0.094 - 1.45
Seminars and talks 1997 - 0.055 - 1.00 - 0.029 - 0.52 0.014 0.24 0.056 0.88
Job rotation 1997 - 0.035 - 0.44 - 0.034 - 0.43 - 0.100 - 1.12 - 0.101 - 1.09
Self-induced learning 1997 0.099 1.54 0.104 1.63 0.047 0.66 0.039 0.54
Quality circles 1997 0.091 1.22 0.089 1.20 0.275*** 3.37 0.275*** 3.24
Share of qualified employees 0.339*** 4.32 0.336*** 4.29 0.437*** 6.18 0.367*** 3.89
Exporter 0.223*** 3.75 0.219*** 3.69 0.185*** 3.79 0.168** 2.41
State of the art technical equipment 0.111** 2.44 0.111** 2.45 0.118*** 3.13 0.205*** 3.98
Investment in IT 0.057 1.25 0.045 0.98 0.118*** 2.68 0.108* 1.84
Co-determination 0.169*** 2.72 0.170*** 2.73 0.207*** 4.19 0.251*** 3.56
Individual firm - 0.347*** - 5.95 - 0.345*** - 5.92 - 0.322*** - 6.66 - 0.358*** - 5.41
Partnership - 0.002 - 0.02 0.007 0.09 - 0.047 - 0.83 - 0.043 - 0.55
Publicly listed company 0.053 0.51 0.058 0.56 - 0.053 - 0.56 - 0.055 - 0.47
Employee Participation 0.084 1.58 0.081 1.53 0.076 1.52 0.063 1.04
Teamwork - 0.032 - 0.54 - 0.031 - 0.52 - 0.034 - 0.62 - 0.013 - 0.18
Units with own costs and results
accounting
0.057 0.87 0.051 0.80 - 0.051 - 0.88 - 0.011 - 0.15
Stringent hiring rules 0.020 0.37 0.024 0.31 - 0.001 - 0.02 0.063 0.98
Incentive payments 0.085 1.28 0.077 1.26 0.158** 2.49 0.108 1.45
Selection Correction term - 0.103*** - 2.30 - 0.187*** - 3.62
Constant 9.738*** 53.24 9.768*** 53.54 9.766*** 72.18 9.677*** 53.09
15 Sector dummies and East Germany
dummy
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1454 1454 1220 1219
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.88
Comment: The significance levels are marked by stars: *** significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent and * at 10 percent.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1997 - 2000, own calculations.
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Table 6: Two-step panel estimates, second step estimates, dependent variable: average residual 1997 - 1999
Equation (6) Equation (6´) Equation (6A) Equation (6A´)
Exogeneous Variables Coefficients t-Values Coefficients t-Values Coefficients t-Values Coefficients t-Values
Training intensity 0.233*** 3.41 0.765*** 5.71
Formal external courses 0.183*** 3.99 0.406*** 7.02
Formal internal courses 0.238*** 4.74 0.289*** 5.73
Training on the job - 0.033 - 0.67 0.013 0.26
Seminars and talks - 0.015 - 0.32 0.039 0.81
Job rotation 0.037 0.49 0.031 0.42
Self-induced learning 0.112* 1.88 0.110* 1.87
Quality circles 0.140** 2.09 0.134** 2.02
Share of qualified employees 0.679*** 10.11 0.496*** 6.50 0.669*** 10.10 0.612*** 9.23
Exporter 0.268*** 5.06 0.251*** 4.79 0.225*** 4.32 0.213*** 4.11
State of the art technical equipment 0.188*** 4.89 0.121*** 3.02 0.172*** 4.55 0.152*** 4.04
Investment in IT 0.157*** 4.05 0.111*** 2.80 0.137*** 3.57 0.103*** 2.68
Co-determination 0.042 0.22 - 0.037 - 0.19 0.033 0.17 0.025 0.13
Individual firm - 0.569*** - 11.29 - 0.560*** - 11.17 - 0.558*** - 11.20 - 0.536*** - 10.82
Partnership - 0.080 - 1.30 - 0.075 - 1.24 - 0.085 - 1.40 - 0.067 - 1.11
Publicly listed company 0.276*** 2.85 0.257*** 2.72 0.235** 2.49 0.237** 2.53
Employee Participation 0.117** 2.45 0.105** 2.22 0.092* 1.95 0.086* 1.84
Teamwork - 0.023 - 0.41 - 0.024 - 0.46 - 0.045 - 0.84 - 0.042 - 0.78
Units with own costs accounting - 0.017 - 0.29 - 0.017 - 0.42 - 0.027 - 0.48 - 0.034 - 0.60
Stringent hiring rules 0.200*** 4.13 0.199*** 4.16 0.169*** 3.51 0.157*** 3.28
Incentive payments 0.157*** 2.59 0.170*** 2.84 0.122** 2.05 0.127** 2.13
Firm size 20-199 1.130*** 23.63 1.019*** 19.84 1.043*** 21.45 0.960*** 19.19
Firm size 200-499 2.189*** 28.26 2.015*** 24.53 1.994*** 24.90 1.841*** 22.15
Firm size 499-1000 2.545*** 22.66 2.377*** 20.79 2.307*** 20.22 2.118*** 18.08
Firm size 1,000+ 3.186*** 28.18 3.037*** 26.98 2.946*** 25.33 2.758*** 23.13
Selection correction term - 0.240*** - 6.26
Constant - 1.347*** - 14.68 - 1.065*** - 10.46 - 1.344*** - 14.85 - 1.386*** - 15.39
15 Sector, East Germany dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2432 2460 2460 2460
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75
Comment: The significance levels are marked by stars: *** significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent and * at 10 percent.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1997 - 2000, own calculations.
